Dvb satellite hack

Sign in. Home Gear Shop Topics ! Forgot your password? Password recovery. Recover your password. July 15, By Editor. Explore additional categories. Explore Other Classes. Blog Questions Forums. In a presentation at the Black Hat security conference in Arlington, Va. And while that's not a particularly new trick--hackers have long been able to intercept satellite TV or other sky-borne signals--Nve also went a step further, describing how he was able to use satellite signals to anonymize his Internet connection, gain access to private networks and even intercept satellite Internet users' requests for Web pages and replace them with spoofed sites.

Exploiting that signal, Nve says he was able to impersonate any user connecting to the Internet via satellite, effectively creating a high-speed, untraceable anonymous Internet connection that that can be used for nefarious online activities. Nve also reversed the trick, impersonating Web sites that a satellite user is attempting to visit by intercepting a Domain Name System DNS request--a request for an Internet service provider ISP to convert a spelled out Web site name into the numerical IP address where it's stored--and sending back an answer faster than the ISP.

That allows him to replace a Web site that a user navigates to directly with a site of his choosing, creating the potential for undetectable cybercrime sites that steal passwords or installs malicious software.

In his tests on the client's network, Nve says he was also able to hijack signals using GRE or TCP protocols that enterprises use to communicate between PCs and servers or between offices, using the connections to gain access to a corporation or government agency's local area network. The Barcelona-based researcher tested his methods on geosynchronous satellites aimed at Europe, Africa and South America. But he says there's little doubt that the same tricks would work on satellites facing North America or anywhere else.

What makes his attacks possible, Nve says, is that DVB signals are usually left unencrypted. That lack of simple security, he says, stems from the logistical and legal complications of scrambling the signal, which might make it harder to share data among companies or agencies and--given that a satellite signal covers many countries--could run into red tape surrounding international use of cryptography. Nve isn't the first to show the vulnerability of supposedly secure satellite connections.

And the same lack of encryption allowed insurgents to hack into the video feed of unmanned U. In fact, the techniques that Nve demonstrated are probably known to other satellite hackers but never publicized, says Jim Geovedi, a satellite security researcher and consultant with the firm Bellua in Indonesia. He compares satellite hacking to early phone hacking or "phreaking," a practice that's not well protected against but performed by only a small number of people worldwide.

They may have some cool tricks but have kept them secret for ages. Jamming is probably the best-known satellite hacking technique; the attacker floods or overpowers a signal, a transmitter, or a receiver, interfering with legitimate transmission.

Interference has become the primary cause of the impairment and degradation of satellite services. The hackers use a directed antenna to produce the interference, usually a specifically crafted signal having enough power to override the original transmitted signal.

Satellite jamming is a hacking method often used to interfere with communication for distribution of media for censorship purpose. Figure 2 — Orbital jamming. Figure 3 — Terrestrial jamming. Otherwise, jamming attacks against a terrestrial device could cause minor damages by impacting a limited portion of the satellite architecture, since downlink jamming is a reversible attack and it affects only users within line of sight of the jammer. Uplink jamming has relatively less impact because it can interfere with the transmission of a satellite over a broad area but only for a temporary period and it does not permanently harm the target system.

The uplink jamming of the control link can prevent a satellite from receiving commands from the ground; it can also target user-transmitted data, thus disturbing the recipients.

An uplink jammer must have at least the same power of the signal it is attempting to block and, during the attack, it must be located within the footprint of the satellite antenna it is targeting. Figure 4 — Satellite Jamming.

The most concerning aspect of jamming attacks is that they can be undertaken using off-the-shelf technology and the detection and attribution of intermittent jamming can be difficult. The use of a continuous wave carrier signal is particularly suspicious because it is unlikely to be an accidental transmission by a friendly user.

At least six different jamming stations were discovered and destroyed. French commercial satellite fleet operator Eutelsat Communications has recently announced the future deployment of an experimental cutting-edge TV channel interference mitigation function for the first time on its upcoming EUTELSAT 8 West B satellite. The satellite is scheduled for launch in and will be stationed over the Middle East and North Africa, the area where the major number deliberate jamming attacks have been observed.

The anti-jamming function will further raise the bar of signal security by increasing control over uplink frequencies to the satellite.

Differently from jamming, eavesdropping on a transmission allows an attacker to access transmitted data. Despite the fact that almost every satellite communication is encrypted, it is quite easy to read posts on the internet that describe how to use off-the-shelf products to intercept satellite transmissions whether they carry satellite broadcast media, satellite telephone conversations, or Internet traffic.

In early German security researchers demonstrated that satellite phones can be easily intercepted and deciphered using equipment readily available on the market, just a personal computer and an antenna were sufficient to hack the two encryption standard algorithms, known as GMR-1 and GMR-2, implemented to protect satellite phone signals of principal phone operators.

These encryption standards were commonly used in the Thuraya satellite phones deployed in Africa, the Middle East, and North Asia.

It is vulnerable to cipher-text-only attacks. The GMR-2 standard introduced a new encryption algorithm, also cryptanalyzed. The speed of deciphering a call is a function of the computing capabilities of the attackers. The two researchers are convinced that the main problem related to the secrecy of both algorithms is that the science community did not test them.

The encryption of data on satellite transmissions has a series of drawbacks. The first is the increase in the costs of operation; another factor to consider is the impact on the overall performance. These considerations discourage the use of encryption for commercial satellite operators, and of course represent an attraction for hackers. The researchers also remarked that the introduction of encryption has a correlated cost to consider, such as implementing or upgrading systems to allow encryption and training staff on the use of the equipment.

The software was used by hackers in Iraq and Afghanistan to capture unencrypted video feeds of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs. The software was used to access data broadcast by satellites. The news created a lot of noise in the military, for it is normal to expect the highest level of security in military equipment, including communication encryption. The fix of the flaw added cost to the military program, but the greatest menace from the eavesdropping of the videos was represented by the disclosure of locations of military areas under military surveillance and of course the patterns followed by drone used for reconnaissance activities.

Figure 5 — SkyGrabber home page. Hijacking is the unauthorized use of a satellite for transmission, or seizing control of a signal, such as a broadcast, and replacing it with another.

The data transmitted could be acquired eavesdropping by attackers who could also modify it in transit spoofing. Attacks against Internet data connections and media broadcasts are very common.

It is unclear if the illegal transmissions were possible due an attack against satellites or Internet-connected. The lack of detail provided in reports led many security experts to believe that the first hypothesis was most probable.

Satellite control is considered very difficult to implement because security measures to protect satellites are very effective against these intentional attacks. Despite the high level of security the menace must be properly approached. An attacker could exploit a flaw in the command and control of commercial satellites, such as VSAT hubs, to compromise also military satellite systems. The best known of alleged takeovers of satellite control occurred in and In particular, a serious attack was observed in when hackers obtained the control of the NASA Terra EOS earth observation system satellite for 2 minutes in June and for another 9 minutes in October.

Unlike the Terra OS incident, this hack did not see control taken away, but access was anyway gained. One of the most classic examples of satellite control attack is the exploitation of the vulnerability of GPS systems, a technology widely used today in commercial and military sectors.

Unlike the case of jamming of GPS signals, in spoofing the targeted receivers are deceived. These attacks are difficult to detect and can be conducted in numerous sectors, from transportation to financial environments.

During the risk assessment, numerous countermeasures that have been classified for their implementation have been evaluated. Principal countermeasures implemented in software on GPS receivers are:.